Venezuela: A Realistic Analysis Without Bias or Partisanship

Professor Heni Ozi Cukier (HOC) is a political scientist whose analyses are not tainted by any bias. His goal is to deliver quality and efficiency in his assessments, which is why he has been remarkably accurate in his most critical predictions. Given the importance of these developments for the region, I bring his insightful evaluation of the current situation as of this Sunday, August 24, 2025.

The analysis below is authored by Professor HOC. I highly recommend subscribing to his channel; the video is linked below the text.

The Americans sent some ships to the Venezuelan coast, and everyone is asking: Is this military force enough to invade Venezuela? Is that the objective?Trump is trying to pressure Maduro. He wants to extract some concession.So, what is really happening? What is the status of the United States’ relationship with Venezuela? What has American policy toward Venezuela been since Trump took office? Why is all this happening now? Is there a real factor behind it happening at this moment? Could it be connected to other geopolitical events?

I know a lot of people out there are saying and repeating different things, but I’m going to show you the truth behind this story. So let’s start by understanding what’s actually happening in Venezuela.

Of course, everyone knows Maduro stole the last election—it was blatant. More than 50 countries in the world did not recognize his government, but instead recognized Gonzales, who won but was never sworn in.

We had a series of episodes, including five members of the Venezuelan opposition who ended up seeking refuge inside the Argentine embassy in Venezuela. They remained there for more than 400 days, until a rescue operation managed to get them out with the help of Argentina and the United States. There is even debate about whether Brazilian military personnel participated in some indirect way.

The Itamaraty certainly did not want to participate, or did not know they had participated, or simply does not acknowledge it. There are some rumors that Brazilian military personnel might have helped the Americans and the Argentinians in that operation. It was a successful operation.

The fact is that Venezuela is the country with the lowest per capita income in Latin America—the worst per capita in the region. More than 7 million Venezuelans have already left the country. It is worth remembering that Venezuela is not in a civil war. It is in total collapse due to a totalitarian regime—the Maduro regime, which is the continuation of Chávez’s system—that dominates the state and the country, destroying absolutely everything for a long time now.

Not to mention—because we cannot ignore it—that Venezuela has a lot of oil. Supposedly, it was a country that should have been very wealthy. But, of course, political choices and corrupt governments destroy any wealth, and Venezuela’s story is no different.

So, this is a bit of what has been happening. Last year, before Trump took office, Biden’s policy toward Venezuela was one of certain relaxation, an attempt to do business with Venezuelan oil given the problems with Russia, the war in Ukraine, and Europe’s dependence.

So, some American companies were allowed concessions to continue exploring oil in Venezuela. And when Trump comes into power, what does he do? He interrupts those concessions and bans those American companies, saying that he will exercise maximum pressure, that he does not recognize Maduro’s Venezuelan government, and that something must be done. So he blocks the American companies. And then Venezuela, and people might not know this.

It is important to understand this in order to contextualize what is at stake and what Trump’s decision—or what he is really aiming for—with this military mobilization actually means. Maduro’s regime has captured American prisoners. This didn’t happen just once, but several times. And through this, he has extracted concessions.

In one such concession, there was a prisoner exchange: American prisoners held by the regime were swapped for Venezuelans who were in U.S. custody. In this process, Trump authorized Chevron to resume oil production in Venezuela. Not long-term, automatically renewable contracts like under Biden, but rather a six-month contract allowing Chevron to produce oil in Venezuela—a signal of a policy that was not as harsh toward Venezuela. In other words, not fully intolerant, still doing business with Venezuela.

Perhaps a quarter of all Venezuelan oil is produced by Chevron. And this authorization, this license from the U.S. government, was given only to Chevron. But it is a sign—let’s say, at the very least—of inconsistency, or of a lack of will to be as tough on Venezuela.

And now, this sudden move by Trump to mobilize troops is connected to some other developments. One of them is an authorization to combat drug cartels worldwide. In fact, Trump’s administration has been labeling these cartels as terrorist organizations. And once an organization is classified as a terrorist group, other kinds of force and policies can be applied against them.

One of the organizations labeled a terrorist group by the U.S. government is the Cartel de los Soles. This cartel is dominated by Maduro’s regime. Literally, Maduro’s regime survives through illicit activities—illegal mining, gold smuggling, drug trafficking, arms trade, and a range of other criminal operations are what keep this regime in power.

Trump is particularly concerned about fentanyl and the drug problem in the United States, which comes through Mexican cartels, plus Colombia, and also Venezuela.

And Maduro’s regime has become a trafficking regime. Venezuela has turned into a narco-state, dominated by illicit activities of organized crime. To give you an idea, 70% of all Colombian drugs pass through Venezuela on their way to other parts of the world. These are very high numbers, and what we see and perceive is that there is actually a fusion between these cartels and the Venezuelan regime. In fact, Colombia’s drug cartels are merging with those of Venezuela.

I’ve already spoken about this in another video, in a livestream where I discussed violence in Latin America. There I explained in more detail these transformations and the migration of drug cartels. There’s also a video here on the channel about the geopolitics of cocaine. Those are good videos for you to watch if you haven’t yet, where I explain more of this whole story and the drug problem in Latin America.

But Trump is concerned about this, and he now has authorization to use force against these cartels. Since Maduro’s regime cannot be separated from a cartel—in fact, they even have their own cartel, the one I just mentioned—that in itself provides justification.

In addition, Trump has many Latino voters who want Venezuela to start functioning again. Venezuela has vast oil reserves and could be a partner state, a friend, if it returned to democracy and has every condition to develop. Of course, it won’t be easy to cleanse the country of so many years of corruption.

So Trump decided to mobilize warships and position them off the Venezuelan coast. At the same time, the bounty on Maduro’s head was raised—from $15 million to now $50 million. The Americans use this as a political tool, as they did against Bin Laden and many other criminals around the world: they offer rewards, and Maduro’s reward has increased.

Maduro, in turn, raised the tone and escalated his rhetoric, claiming he was mobilizing 45 million militiamen from his country. Venezuela did form a militia, but obviously these numbers cannot stand up to a U.S. military operation, should it happen.

And this is the big question: What is Trump planning? Here, we are entering the field of conjecture—there is no clear signal. What we know and understand from all this is that invading another country to overthrow a leader, to topple a regime, is something Americans have learned from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. All politicians who came to power after those decisions—both Democrats and Republicans—have said the same: you don’t invade another country. We will not get entangled in another foreign military operation.

In fact, when Trump recently attacked Iran with bombers—just airplanes bombing the country—part of his own MAGA base opposed it. Several leaders of the Make America Great Again movement rebelled against the idea of attacking Iran, because it looked like another military intervention against another country, a new war that the U.S. would become trapped in. And that is exactly what Americans can no longer bear; they don’t want to pay that price. So be cautious with the idea that the United States is ready to invade Venezuela.

No, invading Venezuela would mean turning that territory into chaos—perhaps even greater chaos than what already exists today. Why greater? Because what would happen after the fall? On whose side would the Venezuelan Bolivarian army stand? On the side of the opposition?

Yes, there is an organized opposition in Venezuela, ready to assume power. But no one takes power without control of the weapons, without military support. That opposition would not be capable of dominating the country, controlling it, and governing. The military is entirely with Maduro, and so far we have not seen any sign of rupture within the armed forces against him.

What we see is a consolidated regime. And this is partly because those same military officers fear that if the regime falls, they will simply be condemned and criminalized for everything that has happened in the country over the past decades. If Maduro falls, they know they will be blamed for countless crimes.

So, you would need to negotiate with them, offering amnesty and convincing them to trust that it would actually be granted. But that is not simple. No one feels secure enough. They would all have to flee. Flee where? Who would grant asylum to all these military men? And how many are they?

From the military’s perspective—and remember, the regime is not composed only of Maduro—there is too much to lose. If Maduro’s government falls, they are unlikely to surrender power. Therefore, it is useless to have a civilian political opposition organized if there is no military force switching sides.

Some say, “When Maduro falls, the military will switch sides.” But why would they? They helped Maduro stay in power. They are part of it, complicit in the whole story. And it’s not just a few people—it’s a lot of people. This negotiation, this signaling, is much more complex. So far, the opposition has not managed to co-opt the military to their side, even with more than 50 countries, as I mentioned, refusing to recognize Maduro’s government.

The opposition has not been able—and it is not an easy mission—to convince the military to switch sides and believe that nothing will happen to them. There is no trust. The armed forces are on the opposite side; they are the ones imprisoning and even killing the opposition. After the last election, the number of dissidents and political persecuted increased substantially. Maduro’s regime began to use direct physical violence against those who opposed his corruption, his fraudulent election, and his seizure of power by force over the years.

Thus, the military is a fundamental piece of Maduro’s regime. It is very difficult to separate one from the other.

The second option, then: If a full invasion is not possible—because how many soldiers would you deploy? 4,000 American soldiers, the number currently aboard those ships near the coast, is not enough to invade Venezuela. You would need a massive military force. It’s out of the question. The United States will not launch a full military invasion to dominate Venezuela, occupy it, and oversee a power transition.

So let’s look at something more gradual. Could a special operation with a small number of troops, aimed solely at capturing or killing Maduro, happen? Perhaps yes. But then the question becomes: what happens the next day?

Let’s look at how Trump behaved in similar situations. In Iran, there was an opportunity to kill the Ayatollah and topple the regime. Trump did not allow Israel to do it because he knew that the next day would be complete chaos in Iran. And chaos in Iran would ripple into chaos everywhere—immense instability, civil war, separatist movements, total disorder, the rise of terrorist groups. It would be worse than it was before.

And Trump did not authorize it; he did not want to pursue regime change by force. If the Iranian population had risen up and rebelled, that would be one thing. But the Venezuelan population has been trying to do this for a long time, and they don’t have weapons or the means to fight against Venezuela’s army.

So, it’s not simple, and obviously, no—Trump is not decided on killing Maduro. The United States is not going to invade Venezuela. A special operation to kill Maduro does not necessarily require troops—you can use a drone or a missile. In fact, Maduro has banned the sale and flying of drones in the country because he feels threatened and fears they might be used to kill him.

There has already been an attempted attack against him with drones—it failed, it didn’t work. Some American private companies, contractors, even participated in the operation in some way, and still they did not kill him. So, it would have to be a more successful operation.

What else might Trump be trying to do? He may be attempting to apply pressure by saying: “Look, I’m here, ready to use force. It’s a threat, a bluff. I’m offering you a way out. You can leave, seek asylum somewhere else, live in another country. We’re not going to arrest you, but you must hand over power.”

And then, in this context of handing over power, he would try to negotiate something similar with the military: “The main ones will all be pardoned, and they will serve the new elected government.”

There are many interests at stake, and it’s not easy to make that happen, but this path seems more plausible.

There is another important point I cannot leave out, because it’s the one people are talking about the most. People who normally don’t follow geopolitics closely—but since geopolitics is part of our daily lives, with something happening every minute—suddenly everyone has something to say about geopolitics. Everyone wants to comment, and many so-called “experts” are claiming: “Trump had a meeting with Putin in Alaska, and they agreed that Trump would overthrow Maduro and Putin would let him.”

Let’s be clear: you need to follow geopolitics more closely to reach this conclusion. The claim has absolutely no meaning. Zero. It makes no sense. Trump does not need Putin’s authorization to act in Venezuela. No, he doesn’t. Venezuela is not an extension of Russian territory. It isn’t.

In fact, let me give you three examples—three conflicts in which Russia was present, participated in wars, and supported those sides, financing long-standing allies. And in all three, when those allies were attacked, Russia did nothing. Nothing. And there was no meeting with Trump or any American president beforehand.

Which cases are these? First, the most recent one: Iran. The United States attacked Iran. Israel attacked Iran. Russia and China stayed silent. They did not come to save Iran, and they are not going to get involved in a war against the United States over Iran.

This even shook the perception of what we call the “Axis of Dictatorships.” Are they really ready to defend each other in every situation? All four of them—Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran? Clearly not. Iran is already the “odd brother out.” They are not willing to help it as much as they would help Russia, China, or North Korea—those three would help each other more firmly.

So, Russia is not willing. It cannot. It doesn’t have the time. You don’t need to ask Russia’s permission. You don’t need to coordinate with Putin over this, because it is irrelevant. Russia doesn’t have that strength; it doesn’t have the ability to project power. It is bogged down in the war in Ukraine to the very last minute, up to its neck.

Second example: a country where Russia had a military base, a strategically important port. Russia defended the regime, helped it survive, but when other insurgent groups—not even the United States, not a massive power, but just a small local force—rose up, Russia did nothing. Which country am I talking about? Syria.

Russia did not save Bashar al-Assad in Syria when the regime fell recently. I repeat: it wasn’t the Americans invading. It was a small, local force. And Russia had a base there, a naval base of extreme importance. Russia had spent billions over the years defending Assad. And then it was about to lose its position, its base, its outpost, its ally—to a group of insurgents. Not to the United States, but to insurgents. And Russia did nothing. It didn’t act.

Next: Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia has troops and a base in Armenia. It has always defended Armenia against Azerbaijan—the Christian Armenians, while the Azeris of Azerbaijan are Shiite Muslims. And what did Russia do when Azerbaijan launched its most recent offensives? It abandoned Armenia.

Why? Because it is focused on other problems. And once again, it wasn’t the United States—it was Azerbaijan.

So, if the United States wanted to take action against a Russian ally, Russia does not have the means, the strength, or the structure to prevent it. It doesn’t.

“Oh, but Russia has nuclear weapons.” So what? Nuclear weapons are not something you can just use at any moment. “Oh, they invaded my ally, so I’ll use an atomic bomb.” No. Nobody believes you’re going to use a nuclear weapon for that. It’s not even worth saying, because everyone knows you won’t. Russia having nuclear weapons makes no difference here. It is not willing to use them to defend Iran, Syria, Armenia, and much less Venezuela.

So, it has nothing to do with it.

“Oh, but isn’t it strange these events happened at the same time?” How many things happen at the same time! Anyone who follows geopolitics closely knows that while we are here talking about this topic, there are 300 other things happening simultaneously. You can construct narratives, elaborate stories about any of them, but they are unrelated. They have nothing to do with each other.

The meeting in Alaska and the movement of American warships around Venezuela are not the product of each other. Trump does not need permission to move ships in the Caribbean—in his own backyard. Trump does not need permission to attack drug cartels in Latin America that affect U.S. national security. He does not need permission from Russia, or China, or Iran, or Cuba. He doesn’t.

He didn’t ask China’s permission. Why? Because China gives as much money to Venezuela as Russia does. China and Iran are just as important to Venezuela as Russia. In fact, Turkey today is another partner alongside Cuba. Venezuela survives thanks to five countries: Cuba, Russia, China, Iran, and Turkey.

Turkey is the most recent partner, helping with gold smuggling, while each of the others provides something—protection, security, weapons, oil, money. Venezuela relies on their support to survive, but not on any of them to directly save it from a U.S. military intervention.

So, there is no connection. These things happened at the same time simply because everything is happening at the same time. While we are here talking about this, tariffs and sanctions are being imposed on Brazil. Meanwhile, Trump was signing a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, consolidating a deal they had already reached, acting as a guarantor—while a thousand other things were happening.

Everything happens simultaneously. Those who don’t follow geopolitics closely try to connect totally unrelated events and assume they are critical factors driving the current situation. Forget it. This movement by Trump has nothing to do with his meeting with Putin. That meeting did not enable Trump to make this decision. This decision is the result of a policy that Trump has been pursuing, although not a very consistent one—as I mentioned earlier with the Chevron oil license issue.

Still, we must recognize that something is changing. Trump may be willing to test the limits of Maduro’s regime. Again, I don’t believe it’s plausible that he would do this through a U.S. military invasion with boots on the ground. Perhaps an operation to kill Maduro—maybe. I think it would be easier to kill him with a missile, a drone, or some other way. Killing Maduro, however, does not necessarily solve the Venezuelan problem, because there is still the military.

But Trump wants to signal that he is putting on pressure. Maduro is afraid—and he should be. If the Americans truly decide to act, it will be easy for them to do so. The problem is not carrying out the action, the problem is dealing with the aftermath. And the aftermath would bring tremendous instability to the region as a whole.

Another important detail about Russia: just to give you an idea, Venezuela’s trade relationship with Russia in 2024 reached between $1.2 and $2 billion. That value is lower than Russia’s trade with Brazil, Colombia, or Chile. So, commercially, Venezuela is not that important. It is not a very solid relationship. Russia has less appetite to invest in Venezuelan oil fields. It already has its own oil fields, and it has China buying its oil.

Does Venezuela serve some geopolitical interest for Russia? Having a presence in the Americas, near the United States? Yes, of course. But Russia is not willing to sacrifice anything, spend money, or get into a collision course with the United States over this. Imagine it—it’s just not willing.

So, we have to pay attention. Part of one of the largest ships that was off the Venezuelan coast had to leave because of a hurricane moving through the Caribbean. So the mobilization lost strength, but it will likely return, and we can expect perhaps something tougher, more forceful.

The Venezuelan opposition is hopeful, wishing the United States will actually do something. Maduro will not fall on his own. You need both internal and external pressure. External political and diplomatic pressure is not enough. We already know you don’t topple a dictator with sanctions or external political pressure. The use of force is the most effective way.

The big question I leave you with is: Does the United States have the stomach for a war, for a military intervention of this scale? To enter the country? Second, is that Trump’s political platform, or is he more of a pacifier? Trump does not want wars. He carried out a pinpoint strike against Iran, then stopped and said: “That’s it, I don’t want anything else, I won’t do anything more.” He even scolded Israel: “No, you violated the ceasefire. I don’t want more fighting.”

Trump wants to say—or to show—that he wants to end all wars. He doesn’t want to start another. But he did carry out a pinpoint strike on Iran. So it’s possible he could do a pinpoint strike on Venezuela, and in that case it would be against Maduro. That wouldn’t solve the whole problem. But still—these are the reflections.

For the moment, we don’t have any larger or more solid moves toward something more complex. This is what we have.

One thing is certain: this movement by Trump is tied to cartels, the fight against drugs, Venezuela’s vast oil, its importance and relevance, and to a more assertive American positioning in the Americas—where the U.S. is trying to influence the future of the continent. After all, this is the region where the United States itself is located.

And let’s be clear: Maduro leads an illegitimate regime, a dictatorship that is causing serious problems for the U.S. through the drug trade. Put all of this together, and there are plenty of reasons for Trump to be making these moves.

The question we must leave open for now, without an answer, is this: How far is Trump willing to go? What is the bluff if he decides to act? What is the tolerance for such an action?

Let’s wait and see. We’ll be here following the next chapters.