What Can Be Measured in the So-Called “War on Drug Trafficking” in the Caribbean?

Recent indicators related to drugs in the United States point to relevant changes between 2024 and 2025, although they do not support the conclusion of a structural and definitive reduction in drug trafficking. Provisional data from the CDC indicate that overdose deaths declined by approximately 24% between October 2023 and September 2024. This represents a significant reduction in the lethal consequences of drug use, particularly involving synthetic opioids, but it cannot automatically be interpreted as a proportional decline in the overall volume of drugs entering the country. Lower lethality may reflect a combination of factors, including changes in drug potency, wider availability of antidotes such as naloxone, shifts in consumption patterns, and, to some extent, changes in supply flows themselves.

At the same time, the U.S. government has intensified military and security operations against international drug trafficking in recent months, with particular emphasis on the Caribbean and the Pacific. These operations have included the interdiction and destruction of vessels suspected of transporting drugs, as part of a broader strategy aimed at disrupting transnational criminal networks. At the political and legal level, this approach has also involved the designation of cartels as terrorist organizations and the expanded deployment of naval, aerial, and intelligence assets, with the explicit goal of increasing operational costs and perceived risk for criminal organizations.

Seizure statistics further underscore the complexity of the situation. Data from the Department of Homeland Security indicate that, over a given period, seizures of fentanyl at the U.S. southern border fell by approximately 56% compared to the previous year. Between January and September 2025, roughly 7,517 pounds of fentanyl were seized, compared to an estimated 16,710 pounds during the same period in 2024, according to consolidated figures from USA Facts. This decline suggests changes in trafficking patterns, routes, and smuggling methods, but it does not necessarily imply a linear reduction in total drug flows, as large quantities of drugs continue to enter the United States through alternative pathways, with cartels adapting rapidly to enforcement pressure.

In the judicial arena, trends are mixed. Federal prosecutions for drug-related crimes reached historically low levels in 2025, partly because resources and agency priorities were redirected to other areas, such as immigration enforcement. This may indicate fewer direct prosecutions of traffickers in certain segments. At the same time, significant federal cases continue to be pursued, including long prison sentences and major indictments involving fentanyl and other substances, demonstrating that criminal enforcement has not been abandoned but rather reorganized in a more selective manner.

From the perspective of public perception, recent surveys suggest that many Americans perceive progress in addressing the drug problem. This perception, however, varies widely across political groups and does not always correspond directly to objective, sustained changes in trafficking or consumption levels.

Taken together, these elements indicate that there are signs of improvement in specific indicators, such as overdose deaths and certain border seizures, but no clear evidence of a generalized and lasting decline in the total volume of drugs trafficked into the United States. What emerges instead is a picture of tactical adjustments, operational shifts, and targeted enforcement intensification, without a clearly established structural transformation of the illicit drug market.

Within this framework, maritime interdiction plays a central role. The destruction of drugs at sea produces an immediate and measurable direct effect: the shipment does not reach consumer markets, criminal organizations suffer direct financial losses, logistical predictability is disrupted, and cash flow used to finance future operations is interrupted. These outcomes are typically measured in tons seized or destroyed and are the most visible data points publicly reported.

However, the most consequential impact occurs at the second level, the indirect or multiplier effect. Recurrent maritime interdiction increases the perceived risk faced by trafficking operators, raising the subjective probability of failure in future operations. Because drug trafficking is governed by continuous risk–return calculations, higher risk leads some shipments to never be launched at all. In addition, organizations respond by fragmenting loads, reducing tonnage per vessel, delaying shipments, and seeking longer and more expensive routes, all of which raise costs and reduce efficiency. There is also a significant psychological and organizational effect: crews become more reluctant, demand higher compensation, desertion increases, information leaks become more likely, and internal conflicts emerge within criminal networks. This is the “invisible” effect, rarely captured in statistics, yet often more important than the interception of any single shipment.

There are also strategic externalities. Criminal organizations must divert resources toward internal security, market supply becomes less predictable, price volatility increases, and pressure intensifies on the weakest links in the trafficking chain, such as transporters and intermediaries. From the state’s perspective, even without eliminating trafficking altogether, these dynamics disrupt and disorganize the criminal system.

Important limitations must nevertheless be acknowledged. The multiplier effect is neither linear nor permanent. Cartels adapt by developing new routes, methods, and technologies. If interdiction is not continuous and visibly sustained, its deterrent effect dissipates. Strategic gains therefore require operational persistence rather than isolated actions.

Even so, from an analytical standpoint, it is plausible to assign a central—though not exclusive, role to intensified maritime interdiction in the Caribbean in explaining reductions on the order of 40% to 60% in certain indicators over short periods. The Caribbean is structurally sensitive: it is a high-density logistical corridor, used for large-scale maritime shipments, dependent on predictable navigation windows, and highly vulnerable to naval, aerial, and satellite presence. When state action is persistent and visible, the impact tends to be systemic rather than marginal.

A reduction of this magnitude does not require the physical destruction of half of all drugs in transit. It is sufficient for a limited number of large shipments to be neutralized and for perceived success rates to fall sharply. This leads to the cancellation of planned shipments, indefinite postponement of others, diversion to longer and costlier routes, and a reduction in average shipment size. This is precisely the multiplier effect of deterrence previously identified. Indirect evidence supporting this interpretation includes simultaneous declines in seizures without immediate compensatory increases on other routes, reductions in downstream indicators such as overdoses, official reports of route displacement rather than mere enforcement success, and the absence of price collapses, suggesting reduced effective supply rather than simply altered methods.

Finally, it must be emphasized that Caribbean interdiction alone does not explain the entire phenomenon. Concurrent factors also play a role, including chemical changes in drugs (greater potency requiring less volume), increased use of micro-routes and human couriers, pre-existing stockpiles, regulatory and inspection changes at legal ports, and shifts in domestic demand. The resulting picture is that of a market under sustained pressure and constant adaptation, in which the most consequential effects are not limited to drugs seized, but extend to shipments that never materialize in the first place.