Trump Acts Like a Soviet: Don’t Idolize Him as “Right-Wing”; He’s a Protectionist and a Censor

Economic protectionism is not “hardcore right-wing”; it is market control

Trump sells himself as pro–free market, but in practice he adopts an interventionist State logic: tariffs, barriers, trade punishments, and pressure on supply chains. That is not economic liberalism. It is a directed economy, with the government picking winners and losers.

Economic nationalism is the modern version of central planning

The idea of “America First” often becomes an argument to manipulate trade, force companies to relocate, and use the State as an instrument of economic coercion. This is a mentality typical of regimes that treat the market as a political tool, not as an environment of freedom.

The rhetoric of “internal enemies” is classic authoritarian playbook

The claim that there is an infiltrated “system,” saboteurs, traitors, and a conspiring elite is the same historical script used by governments that need to justify exceptional measures. When a leader creates a permanent enemy, he also creates the perfect excuse to concentrate power.

Censorship is not only banning newspapers: it is intimidation, suffocation, and narrative control

Modern censorship does not need tanks to shut down the press. It only needs to: delegitimize journalists, pressure platforms, threaten outlets, encourage public harassment, and turn any criticism into a “moral crime.” The intention is the same: reduce the space for criticism and impose a monopoly on truth.

Controlling public debate through “patriotism” is disguised ideological control

When the standard becomes “whoever criticizes is anti-American,” free speech becomes conditional on obedience. That is the opposite of the classic liberal-conservative spirit, which tolerates dissent and understands criticism as part of the democratic game.

Politics as spectacle serves to replace institutions with a cult of the leader

The leader becomes the State itself. Personal loyalty becomes more valuable than rules, principles, and institutional limits. That is not institutional conservatism. That is political personalism—much closer to authoritarian models than to a democratic right.

The idea that “the law only matters when it benefits me” is anti–rule of law

A politician who relativizes justice, the press, elections, and oversight is not defending order: he is defending selective impunity. Authoritarian regimes work exactly like that: law for others, protection for allies.

Intervening in companies and sectors becomes political blackmail

Pressuring companies, threatening contracts, encouraging boycotts, and using the State to punish “enemies” is a coercive method typical of governments that do not accept the autonomy of the private sector. It is crony capitalism with a populist aesthetic.

Protectionism creates “state capitalism,” not free capitalism

A tariff becomes a hidden tax that raises consumption costs and distorts competition. And when that is sold as “defending the people,” the usual result is: more power for the government and more dependence on economic groups aligned with power.

Censorship and protectionism go together: both depend on control

To control the economy, you need to control the narrative. To control the narrative, you need to intimidate dissent. It is no coincidence: regimes that centralize the economy tend to centralize communication.

Trump does not represent the “right”; he represents power populism

The right, in the classical sense, defends institutions, limits on the State, economic freedom, and pluralism. Trump operates under a different logic: concentrated power, the State as a weapon, and moral rhetoric used to justify coercion.

If someone idolizes Trump as an automatic symbol of the “right,” they are ignoring the main point: he acts with tools typical of statist and authoritarian governments protectionism, institutional pressure, and attempts to control public debate. That is closer to a Soviet-style mentality of control than to a liberal and democratic right.

This becomes even clearer when you look at the political side effect: he pulls the debate into the territory of fear and reaction, and that often reorganizes the opposing camp, rescues worn-out leaders, and produces victories the left could not achieve on its own.

Lula’s Popularity Recovery and the Trump Context

1. Lula’s popularity was declining in 2025

In early 2025, polls showed President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s approval at historically low levels for his administrations, with disapproval approaching or surpassing approval in several surveys throughout the year.

2. The escalation of conflict with Trump reshaped perceptions

When U.S. President Donald Trump announced high tariffs on Brazilian products, a move initially designed to pressure Brazil and benefit allies such as Jair Bolsonaro, it ended up becoming a factor of domestic mobilization inside Brazil.

3. Lula’s response to the external “attack” created a rally-around-the-flag effect

The Brazilian government reacted by harshly criticizing the tariffs as undue interference, emphasizing the defense of national sovereignty. That posture increased public support for Lula among certain segments, generating a “unity effect” in the face of external pressure—something that often benefits leaders when confronted with a foreign adversary perceived as hostile.

4. Polls recorded an improvement in approval

Polling data throughout 2025 showed:

• Lula’s approval surpassing disapproval around midyear in at least one survey round.

• Pollsters such as Ipespe and Genial/Quaest indicating improved approval and reduced rejection.

• Part of the popularity gains being associated with the positive repercussion of a Lula–Trump meeting at the UN, according to polling analysts.

5. Political interpretation

The dynamic was similar to situations observed in other countries: when a foreign leader adopts postures perceived as hostile, it can boost support for the national leadership, even if approval had been low. This does not mean the recovery was exclusively caused by Trump; domestic factors such as social or economic policies also matter. But the reaction to external pressure acted as a catalyst for popular support.

Canada’s 2025 Federal Election

1. Date and outcome

Canada’s federal election took place on April 28, 2025, to elect the 45th House of Commons.

The Liberal Party, led by Mark Carney, remained in power with a minority government and won the largest share of the popular vote and seats, reversing earlier expectations of defeat.

2. The pre-election scenario

Before voting day, the Conservative Party under Pierre Poilievre appeared ahead in the polls by a considerable margin and was widely seen as the favorite to win a majority.

3. The relevance of relations with the United States

The campaign was shaped by domestic issues (economy, cost of living, housing, crime, etc.), but tensions with the United States, including tariffs and threats from President Trump—played a significant role in electoral mobilization.

According to late-campaign analyses, Trump’s comments about Canada including unusually harsh rhetorical threats reinforced a sense of patriotism and criticism of U.S. foreign policy, which helped stabilize Liberal support at the ballot box.

4. Outcome and repercussions

The Liberal Party did not win an outright majority, but consolidated its position as the largest parliamentary force.

The victory represented a trend reversal, since earlier polls and projections had pointed to a wide Conservative advantage.

The result has been seen as a sign that voters rejected direct associations with Trump-aligned agendas, especially on issues of sovereignty and trade policy.

Connecting Lula, Trump, and Canada’s Election

Although Brazil and Canada have very different contexts, there is a common line:

Trump’s external pressure ended up strengthening political opponents of the very forces he intended to favor.

In Brazil, it helped boost Lula’s approval at a critical moment.In Canada, it contributed to a negative popular reaction that, at least in part, benefited the Liberals against Conservative momentum.

This dynamic suggests not merely an incidental effect, but a pattern in which aggressive cross-border policies mobilize domestic public opinion against the figure or agenda associated with the external actor.

If you want, I can develop a deeper analysis of these interactions (including polling numbers and electoral trends), or connect these events to global comparative political phenomena.

Trump Is a Tireless Admirer of Putin, a Nostalgic Sympathizer of the USSR

A) The rhetorical pattern: personal praise and validation of the “strongman”

Trump has repeatedly described Putin with words such as “strong,” “smart,” “clever,” “very shrewd.” Even when he criticizes a specific act, he tends to separate the act from the person and return to the central point: Putin as someone effective, tough, dominant.

That matters because it is not the typical vocabulary of a Western leader speaking about a strategic adversary. In general, praise comes with institutional caveats. Trump often praises without a moral counterbalance, which sends a symbolic message: he admires the style, the authority, the ability to impose one’s will.

B) Indirect defense: downplaying blame and shifting responsibility

A common trait in Trump’s statements is the move of “displacement.” Instead of treating Russia as the aggressor objectively and directly, he often frames the scenario as:

• “the U.S. provoked it”

• “NATO provoked it”

• “Europe is to blame”

• “Ukraine made mistakes”

• “Biden is weak”

• “this wouldn’t have happened under me”

That kind of framing is not neutral. It reduces the centrality of Russia’s decision and, as a consequence, cleans up Putin’s image in public debate. In practice, Trump acts like a contextual defense attorney: “Putin did it, but look…”.

C) The obsession with “negotiating with the strong leader” as a magic solution

Trump sells the idea that wars and international crises can be solved with “a conversation” between leaders, as if institutions, alliances, sovereignty, and international law were accessories.

That view fits perfectly with the Putin model:

• concentrated decision-making

• personalist diplomacy

• deals as imposition, not consensus

When Trump suggests the problem is a lack of “respect” and that it is enough to “be tough” for Putin to back down, he reinforces the logic of authoritarianism: the world is a chessboard of bosses, not a system of rules.

D) What he truly admires: internal control and social discipline

Putin represents a type of leadership Trump seems to consider desirable:

• domesticated press

• weakened opposition

• disciplined state apparatus

• a single national narrative

• exemplary punishment of opponents

Trump does not need to literally say “I want to be like Putin.” The admiration appears when he treats that kind of command as “strength,” not as a democratic risk.

It is the same reasoning of someone who confuses authority with legitimacy.

E) The most sensitive point: Trump often acts as if “institutions” were enemies

Liberal democracy depends on:

• free press

• independent judiciary

• professional bureaucracy

• alternation of power

• limits on the executive

Putin governs with the opposite: a State centered on the leader and sustained by control. And Trump, at various moments, shows impatience with the institutional checks of the American system, treating them as “sabotage” by the “deep state.”

When he looks at Putin and sees efficiency, he is admiring precisely what democracy tries to prevent: power without restraints.

F) Why this becomes an “own goal” for the democratic right

If the right wants to remain a viable political field in democracies, it must defend:

• rule of law

• property rights and economic freedom

• freedom of expression

• institutional stability

The problem is that the “Putin model” is a mix of:

• state nationalism

• political repression

• an economy controlled by oligarchs

• propaganda and coercion

That is, in practice, authoritarianism with crony capitalism. It is not “liberal right-wing.” It is something else.

And when Trump normalizes Putin as an “admirable leader,” he pushes the right into a toxic place: it becomes associated not with freedom, but with “efficient” authoritarianism.

G) Summary: the admiration is not a detail, it is a sign of a power project

The thread is simple: Trump shows sympathy for leaders who concentrate power and impose obedience and Putin is one of the most emblematic examples of that style.

That is why, when Trump “defends” Putin (directly or indirectly), it is not only geopolitics. It is identification with an archetype: the leader who commands, silences opponents, and governs as the owner of the country.